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Abstract 
We discuss and empirically examine a firm-level equivalent of the ancient problem of “tying the 
King’s hands,” namely how to maximize managerial intervention for “good cause,” while 
avoiding intervention for “bad cause.” Managers may opportunistically intervene when such 
intervention produces private benefits.  Overall firm performance is harmed as a result, because 
opportunistic managerial intervention harms employee motivation.  The central point of the 
paper is that various mechanisms and factors, such as managers staking their personal reputation, 
employees controlling important assets, strong trade unions, corporate culture, etc. may function 
as constraints on managerial proclivities to opportunistically intervene. Thus, firms can make 
credible commitments that check managerial proclivities to opportunistically intervene. We 
derive 5 hypotheses from these ideas, and test them, using path-analysis, on a rich dataset, based 
on 329 firms in the Spanish food and electric/electronic industries. 
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I. Introduction 
In this paper we discuss and empirically examine a firm-level equivalent of the ancient problem 
of “tying the King’s hands” (Root 1989).  A key theme in much of the work on the theory of the 
firm (e.g., Coase 1937; Malmgren 1961; Casson 1994; Williamson 1996; Foss 1997; Wernerfelt 
1997) is that the exercise of authority in the form of managerial fiat in response to changes in the 
environment provides a reason why firms exist.  Such managerial intervention will typically 
override existing instructions of employees, and in firms where employees are given considerable 
discretion, managerial intervention may furthermore amount to overruling decisions made by 
these employees on the basis of delegated decision rights. 
 A fundamental (though arguably somewhat neglected) set of problems is that the option to 
intervene (1) “… can be exercised both for good cause (to support expected net gains) and for bad 
(to support the subgoals of the intervenor)” (Williamson 1996: 150-151), (2) it may be difficult to 
verify the nature of the cause, and (3) promises to only intervene for good cause are hard to make 
credible because they are not enforceable in a court of law. There is thus a problem of “… 
credibly [promising] to respect autonomy save for those cases where expected net gains to 
intervention can be projected” (Williamson 1993: 104).  A primary challenge  in  theory as 
well as managerial practice  is therefore how to maximize managerial intervention for “good 
cause,” while avoiding intervention for “bad cause.”1 
 In this paper, we contribute to the understanding of this problem by examining how firms 
can make credible commitments that make (perceived and/or real) opportunistic managerial 
intervention (Dow 1987; Kreps 1990), “intervention for bad cause,” less likely. Our overarching 
perspective on these issues is mainly drawn from organizational economics (e.g., Milgrom 1988; 
Jensen and Meckling 1992; Bijl 1996; Milgrom and Roberts 1996; Williamson 1996; Aghion and 
Tirole 1997; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2000), and on political economy work on credible 
commitments (e.g., Weingast and Marshall 1988; Miller 1992; Miller and Hammond 1994; Moe 
1997).  However, in order to lend further support for our arguments, we also draw on ideas about 
psychological contracts in organizations (Argyris 1960; Rousseau 1989; Coyle-Shapiro and 
 
1 Milgrom and Roberts (1996: 168) argue that “… the very existence of centralized authority is incompatible with a 
thorough going policy of efficient selective intervention.  The authority to intervene inevitably implies the authority to 
intervene inefficiently.”  While we agree that “first-best intervention” is strictly impossible, “second-best 
intervention” is feasible. 
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Kessler 2000; Tepper and Taylor 2003), extrinsic and intrinsic motivation (Osterloh and Frey 
2000), and psychological research on decision-making (e.g., Bazerman 1994).  
Our argument begins from the observation that all firms that are larger than the one-man 
firm rely on both the use of managerial authority and employee discretion, that is, the ability of 
employees to control resources including their own human capital.  While authority is needed, 
for example, to manage residual interdependencies, discretion may be rationally delegated to 
employees, because it stimulates motivation and fosters local learning and the use of local 
knowledge. A considerable body of work in organization theory, including organizational 
economics, has addressed issues that relate to the distinction between authority and delegation, 
such as the optimal span of control (Williamson 1970), the design of information structures 
(Galbraith 1974), and optimal delegation given the moral hazard problem (Jensen and Meckling 
1992; Armstrong 1994; Aghion and Tirole 1997). In these treatments, authority is a matter of 
control and the giving of orders. Other issues that are implied by the distinction between 
authority and discretion have arguably been given less attention, notably how the exercise of 
authority in the form of opportunistic managerial intervention harm motivation, diminishing the 
beneficial effects of discretion.2   From this perspective, a basic problem in organizational design 
is that beneficial delegation is hard to sustain under the property rights structure characterizing 
the firm in which delegated decision rights are always “loaned, not owned” (Baker et al. 1999).  
Thus, those who hold ultimate decision rights (i.e., authority) may use these to renege on 
delegation, overrule decisions made on the basis of delegated rights, and selectively intervene for 
bsad cause. This harms employee motivation. However, managers may be constrained by 
various mechanisms, including implicit contracts (Kreps 1990; Baker et al. 1999) or explicit 
credible commitments (Brocker et al. 1992; Moe 1997) that reduce the incidence and severity of 
such harmful interventions. 
 The design of the paper is as follows: We develop a notion of authority that goes beyond 
the picking of well-defined actions from an employee’s action set (as in Simon 1951) and also 
includes the power to delegate and constrain discretion, as well as the ability to veto 
subordinates’ decisions.  We also focus on the costs and benefits of delegating discretion to 
employees.  We then turn to a discussion of the motivational problems that may arise when 
managers exercise authority by reneging on the delegation of discretion, that is “opportunistic 
 
2 However, see Rousseau (1989), Robinson and Rousseau (1994), and Robinson and Morrison (1995) for 
organizational behavior work, and Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999, 2002) for 
organizational economics work, that has a strong bearing on these issues. 
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managerial intervention.”  It is often in an organization’s interest to avoid such managerial 
intervention. There are various mechanisms that may credibly constrain the flexibility of 
managers to intervene opportunistically.  Some of these are external to the firm (e.g., tight labor 
and capital markets, strong labor unions), and some are internal to the firm.  In the latter category 
are credible commitments undertaken by managers themselves (e.g., managers staking personal 
reputations), as well as employees controlling critical resources.  A number of hypotheses are 
derived and tested on data from the Spanish electronics and food industries.  To the best of our 
knowledge, the present paper represents the first empirical, firm-level work on these issues. 
II. Managerial Intervention and Delegation: 
Tensions and Credible Managerial Commitment 
Authority and Delegation of Discretion 
 Simon (1951) provides a classic notion of authority.  Authority is defined as the situation 
in which  a “boss” is permitted by a “worker” to select actions, A0 ⊂ A, where A is the set of the 
worker’s possible behaviors.   For the worker to accept the assignment, it must lie within his 
“zone of acceptance.” A limitation of this notion of authority is that it seems to be based on the 
boss having all the information, the worker being merely a passive instrument who reacts to 
instructions based on this information.  This is a notion that does not square easily with the 
(alleged) increasing importance of partly self-managing knowledge-workers in modern 
production (e.g., Purser 1998). 
 Simon (1991: 31) himself later noted that authority may be understood more broadly, 
namely as a command that takes the form of a result to be produced, a principle to be applied, or 
goal constraints, so that “[o]nly the end goal has been supplied by the command, and not the 
method of reaching it.” However, even this is arguably too narrow.  Usually, some aspects of 
“the method of reaching” an end goal are specified, so that employees are seldom granted full 
discretion.  Indeed, a function of authority is the placing of restrictions on the decision rights that 
are granted to employees with respect to how they reach an end goal (Milgrom 1988; Barzel 
1997; Holmström 1999).  Authority in the sense of placing restrictions on behavior is exercised 
in order to avoid costs associated with unwanted externalities, including, but by no means limited 
to, the costs of morally hazardous behavior.  Such externalities may also include coordination 
failures, such as scheduling problems, duplicative efforts (e.g., of market information gathering 
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or R&D), and cannibalization of product markets and other instances of decentralized actions 
being inconsistent with the firm’s overall strategic planning.  These externalities arise when 
employees exercise discretion. 
 Discretion may be defined as the ability of an agent to exercise control over a resource, 
that is, she is able to allocate that resource to a purpose that she, for whatever reason, finds 
suitable (Barzel 1997).  There are various reasons why firms may delegate discretion.  For 
example, if the employee is better informed than the manager with respect to how certain tasks 
should be carried out, and this knowledge is costly to communicate (Casson 1994; Melumad et 
al. 1995), efficient co-location of decision-making rights and knowledge requires that employees 
are delegated discretion with respect to how they use their expertise in problem solving (Jensen 
and Meckling 1992). Also, delegation may be undertaken for motivational rather than 
knowledge-based reasons.   Thus, a long tradition in social psychology (probably beginning with 
Roethlisberger et al. 1939) and more recently in the empowerment literature (Conger and 
Canungo 1988; Thomas and Velthouse 1990; Gal-Or and Amit 1998), suggests that increasing 
the delegation of discretion to employees often “… raises the perceived self-determination of 
employees and therewith strengthens intrinsic motivation” (Osterloh and Frey 2000: 543).  In 
turn, this may lead to an increase in creativity in the pursuit of goals.3  Expert knowledge is better 
utilized and learning is fostered (Mudambi et al. 2003).   In contrast, decreasing the level of 
delegated discretion may crowd out intrinsic motivation, particularly when this frustrates the 
employee’s “… beliefs regarding the terms and conditions of the reciprocal exchange 
agreement” (Rousseau 1989: 23).  These arguments suggest the following hypothesis:  
Hypotheses 1:  Employee motivation depends positively on the degree of delegation of 
discretion. 
 
3 Some reservations and potential critiques should be noted at this point.  First, it is conceivable that discretion 
may harm motivation if employees do not have the knowledge or personality to command such discretion.  
Second, employees may feel uncomfortable with increased discretion because it may imply responsibilities 
without additional pay or benefits. In short, employees need to have not just the opportunity, but also the ability 
and incentive to engage in self-management (cf. Mowday et al. 1982).  We hypothesize, however, that on the 
aggregate (firm) level, the positive motivational effects of increased delegation dominate the negative ones, and 
that opportunity to engage in self-management is at least to some extent matched by a corresponding ability to 
do so.  Third, in the model we later test, we assume a linear relation between delegation and motivation and 
performance.  This, too, may be criticized.  We have tested whether the inclusion of the squared variable for 
delegation improves the goodness of fit and provides a significant coefficient.  However, it turns out that the 
coefficients are not significant and that, although the absolute and incremental goodness of fit increases slightly, 
the parsimounious goodness of fit decreases considerably.  We therefore opted for not including this squared 
variable. 
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We further argue that the motivational effects of increased delegation give rise to improved 
employee productivity.  Partial evidence for this is the finding that giving R&D personnel the 
right to share research findings with others and to publish such findings increase R&D 
productivity (McMillan et al. 2000; Mudambi et al. 2003). In turn, increased employee 
productivity causes firm performance to improve.   
 There are more direct reasons why delegation may improve firm performance.  Thus, 
employees may be better informed than managers with respect to how certain tasks should be 
carried out (Jensen and Meckling 1992).  If such knowledge is costly to communicate efficient 
co-location of decision-making rights and knowledge then requires that employees are delegated 
discretion with respect to how they use their expertise in problem solving (Casson 1994; 
Melumad et al. 1995).  Furthermore, it is arguable that delegating discretion to employees will 
not only lead to a better use of existing knowledge, but also to the discovery of new knowledge 
that would not have been discovered in the absence of delegation (Miles et al. 1997). This 
reasoning gives rise to the following hypothesis:  
Hypotheses 2:  Firm performance depends positively on the degree of delegation of 
discretion to employees.  
So far, nothing has been said about the cost dimensions of delegation.  Although we do not test 
hypotheses regarding the costs of delegation, we use insights in these costs to develop other 
hypotheses. The costs of delegation are treated in the rich agency literature on optimum 
delegation (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1992; Armstrong 1994; Aghion and Tirole 1997; Gal-Or 
and Amit 1998).  A general conclusion is that delegation creates opportunities for employees to 
collect informational rents and/or engage in morally hazardous activities (i.e., “employee 
opportunism”).  Roughly, optimum delegation obtains when the incremental gain from making 
use of expert knowledge equals the incremental costs from loss of control.  The cost caused by 
control loss is ultimately rooted in the differing preferences of managers and employees in the 
relevant hierarchy and the costs of monitoring relevant aspects of the employee’s activities.     
 Although the agency approach is useful for framing the cost aspects of delegation, it has 
certain limitations.  First, it builds on an assumption of complete contracting, which makes it 
hard to provide a rationale for authority (Hart 1995), except in the limited sense of monitoring.  
Second, it abstracts from those costs of delegation that are not the result of moral hazard, but 
rather of mistakes, sub-goal optimization, duplicative efforts, wrong timing of decisions and 
erroneous co-location of knowledge and decision rights made by entirely well-intentioned 
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employees (cf. Hendry 2002), and which may be reduced by means of the exercise of the 
authority.   
 Thus, in actuality the tradeoff associated with the optimum level of delegation involves 
many variables. It may change over time as the relevant determinants change.  Given this, a key 
management task arguably is to exercise authority in such a way that the organization gropes 
towards optimum delegation, and to track the optimum level of delegation in the face of 
changing contingencies. Thus, there will necessarily be an interdependence between delegation 
and authority. Discussing the issues of authority and discretion separately is, therefore, 
problematic because the interdependence between authority and discretion gives rise to distinct 
organizational problems, notably the incentive liabilities associated with managerial intervention 
that is perceived by employees to be opportunistic. 
Managerial Intervention and Changes in Delegation 
 As discussed earlier, there are both beneficial and negative implications for 
organizations of delegating discretion to employees.  Thus, firms confront a basic tradeoff in 
the choice of delegation.  In the absence of managerial intervention, once implemented, 
optimum delegation will continue as long as contingencies, such as technology, tastes, 
competitive conditions and other external contingencies remain relatively stable, and as long 
as managers do not see a need for changing the firm’s overall strategy or the internal resource 
allocation in the firm.   Given this, there are three overall reasons why optimum delegation 
may change, namely, first, as a response to changed external contingencies (Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967; Casson 1994); second, as a result of changed managerial perceptions with 
respect to the firms overall strategy and internal resource allocation (Penrose 1959); and, 
third, some mix of the two.  We briefly consider the first two reasons in the following. 
 Externalities are an important determinant of the costs and benefits of delegation of 
discretion.  With respect to the benefit side, externalities may enter to the extent that increased 
delegation is accompanied by, for example, increased knowledge-sharing (Osterloh and Frey 
2000; Mudambi et al. 2003).  With respect to the cost side, externalities enter, for example, in 
the form of the moral hazard, duplicative efforts, and misuse of corporate resources that may 
result from delegation.  Thus, although delegation may be a part of an attempt to make the 
organization more modular (Zenger 2002), complex interdependencies are not necessarily 
eliminated by delegation per se.  Indeed, delegation of discretion may sometimes introduce 
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more interdependencies between organizational units (e.g., when delegation implies more 
horizontal links between units).  Also, delegation may imply more extensive rights to draw on 
corporate resources (as in a matrix organization).   
 Because complex interdependencies still exist under delegated discretion, major 
changes in contingencies are likely to change the optimum degree of delegation.  For 
example, changes in the firm’s overall strategy may require the building-up of a new product 
platform. Such new technologies typically require the delegation of more discretion to 
designers and engineers in order to stimulate exploration through wide bandwidth 
communication channels.  Or, a change in the competitive conditions, such as an impending 
price war, may dictate that discretion be diminished in order to curb slack and reduce costs. 
Many contingencies cannot be foreseen, or it is too costly to try to do so (Malmgren 1961; 
Williamson 1996).  Moreover, how exactly contingencies impact on the preferred level of 
delegation may also be difficult to specify ex ante (Coase 1937). This introduces a need for ex 
post decision-making (Coase 1937; Malmgren 1961; Williamson 1996).  Centralized 
decision-making, that is, discretionary authority, becomes a preferable mechanism of 
coordination when those who may hold authority has a superior understanding of how 
contingencies influence interdependencies and how this impacts on the preferred degree of 
delegation.  
 The preferred delegation of discretion may also change because of changed managerial 
perceptions, even if no outside contingencies change. For example, a change in the 
management team may cause the team’s “image” (Penrose 1959) of the firm’s opportunity set 
to change.  Or, managers may develop certain cognitive biases that twist their assessment of 
costs and benefits (Bazerman 1994), leading them to change their perception of what the 
optimal trade-off is.  For example, under what psychologists call the “loss aversion bias,” a 
loss relative to the status quo is seen as more undesirable than a gain relative to the same 
status quo is seen as desirable (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1991).  This may lead managers to 
overestimate costs relative to benefits, which will cause them to change the degree of 
delegation of discretion.  
 These psychological effects may be aggravated by overconfidence biases. Robust 
findings in experimental psychology show the presence of a systematic overconfidence bias in 
judgment, that is, people tend to trust their own judgments more than is “objectively” 
warranted.  Managers are not likely to be exceptions to this bias, perhaps quite the contrary. 
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The presence of the overconfidence bias in the judgments that underlie managerial decision-
making may strengthen managers’ incentive to change the level of delegation of discretion.  
Changing delegation of discretion may not, as argued earlier, in itself be harmful to employee 
motivation, namely when employees and management basically agree on the need for a 
change.  However, the presence of biases in the perceptions and judgments of the parties 
means that it is harder for employees to ascertain whether intervention takes place for bad or 
for good causes, that is, whether or not there is a break with established implicit contracts and 
commitments to refrain from opportunistic intervention. We consider opportunistic 
managerial intervention in the following section. 
Opportunistic Managerial Intervention and Employee Motivation 
 Williamson’s (1996) distinction between intervention for good cause and intervention for 
bad cause (i.e., opportunistic managerial intervention) is a fundamental one, because it directs 
attention to the benefits as well as the costs of managerial authority.   In terms of Williamson’s 
distinction the preceding examples of managerial intervention largely fall in the category of 
intervention for good cause, although we have introduced a perceptual and cognitive issue, 
namely, employees may mistake good for bad causes and vice versa, that is not present in 
Williamson’s discussion. More generally, employee motivation is arguably mediated by 
employee perceptions of what motivates managerial intervention and whether and in which 
manner managerial intervention breaks with existing psychological contracts (Rousseau 1989; 
Robinson and Morrison 1995; Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 2000).  Thus, intervention that 
essentially harms employees (e.g., leads to layoffs) may still not harm motivation, particularly in 
a time of a severe organizational crisis and given that management succeeds in convincing 
employees of the need for layoffs.  Or, managerial intervention that objectively benefits all 
relevant parties may be perceived by employees as breaking with psychological contracts.  In 
sum, in ascertaining the nature of managerial intervention, employees face a complicated signal 
extraction problem.  Our focus is on managerial intervention that is perceived by employees as 
“intervention for bad cause,” that is, “opportunistic managerial intervention.”4 
 The relevant organizational behavior literature, which is largely based on social 
psychology (Argyris 1960; Rousseau 1989; Robinson and Morrison 1995; Coyle-Shapiro and 
 
4 Note that this is not entirely congruent with the notion of opportunism in Williamson (1996), primarily because 
Williamson does not incorporate the perceptual issues that we do, and therefore does not allow for difficulties of 
distinguishing between what is and what is not opportunistic behavior. 
  
9
 
                                                
Kessler 2000), suggests that such managerial intervention amount to, in economic terms, 
reneging on implicit contracts or explicit commitments.  For example, managers may overrule 
employee decisions that are made on the basis of delegated decision rights, or managers may 
renege on the level of delegation itself.   As further suggested by the relevant organizational 
behavior literature (e.g., Robinson and Rousseau 1994; Rousseau 1989), loss of motivation 
results. In particular, organizational citizenship behavior  that is, employee behavior that 
promotes organizational efficiency but is not (perhaps, cannot be) explicitly recognized by an 
organization’s reward system   may suffer from opportunistic managerial intervention 
(Robinson and Morrison 1995).  
 The psychological literature on cognitive biases suggests further reasons why 
motivation may be harmed by opportunistic managerial intervention.  In an employee 
relationship, employees develop implicit and explicit expectations of the contract governing 
the relationship (Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 2000), and particularly of the benefits that they 
believe they deserve under the implicit contract, that is, their “entitlements” (Heath et al. 
1993).  For example, certain levels of delegated discretion may become “status quo” points, in 
the sense that they represent what employees believe are their entitlements.  Thus, if employs 
enjoy considerable discretion this may become part of their (perceived) entitlements. As 
discussed earlier, loss aversion implies that a loss relative to the status quo point is seen as 
more undesirable than a gain relative to the same point is seen as desirable.  This means that 
employees will develop a bias against changing the level of discretion in a downwards 
direction, and that they can be expected to resist such changes, as well as suffer a loss of 
motivation if the change is, in fact, forced upon them.  The above reasoning is summed up in 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3:  Employee motivation varies negatively with opportunistic managerial 
intervention. 
For the firm, this is a problem to the extent that loss of motivation leads to employees cutting 
back on the effort they supply to the firm, and also on their firm-specific investments in 
human capital.5  This implies the following hypothesis: 
 
5 Of course, loss of motivation may not automatically lead to, for example, less effort supply, if monitoring 
systems or extrinsic motivation can substitute for the loss of motivation caused by opportunistic managerial 
intervention. 
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Hypothesis 4:  Overall firm performance varies negatively with opportunistic managerial 
intervention. 
Why Opportunistic Managerial Intervention? 
 As suggested earlier, the problem of loss of motivation because of opportunistic managerial 
intervention is related to what Oliver Williamson (1996: 150) calls the “impossibility of selective 
intervention,” that is, the puzzle of “Why can’t a large firm do everything that a collection of 
small firms can and more?”  Thus, a large firm could replicate the market and only selectively 
intervene when there would be expected net gains from this, so that “… the firm will do at least 
as well as, and will sometimes do better than, the market.” However, Williamson points out 
argues that such selective intervention is  ”impossible.” Incentives are diluted, because the option 
to intervene ”… can be exercised both for good cause (to support expected net gains) and for bad 
(to support the subgoals of the intervenor)” (Williamson 1996: 150-151), and employees know 
this.  Promises to only intervene for good cause can never be credible, Williamson argues, 
because they are not enforceable in a court of law.  A fundamental problem  in  theory as well 
as managerial practice  is therefore how to maximize managerial intervention for “good cause,” 
while avoiding intervention for “bad cause.”  Our discussion provides a further reason why first-
best selective intervention is impossible: Employees may have difficulties distinguishing between 
intervention for good and bad cause.     
 However, apart from these perceptual problems it is not immediately apparent why 
opportunistic managerial intervention should ever take place.  According to Hypothesis 4 
opportunistic managerial intervention destroys value.  However, there are least two explanations 
for why value-destroying opportunistic managerial intervention may take place, namely 
managerial private benefits and managerial time inconsistency.  
 According to the first explanation, managers may derive a private benefit (in whatever 
form) from managerial intervention that destroys value, when organizational and private costs 
and benefits are timed in certain ways.  For example, managers who are up for promotion may 
derive private benefits from imposing restrictions to strongly cut the costs of the slack and 
spillover effects associated with a high level of delegation of discretion.  If organizational 
benefits follow later than these costs, managers have an incentive to engage in managerial 
intervention that harms motivation.  The organizational costs of such actions may not be borne 
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by the managers themselves, for example, because they may have left the firm or the position in 
favor of another firm or position.6  
 The explanation from managerial time inconsistency relates to a familiar problem in 
political economy (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Moe 1997).  Typically, this problem starts out 
from a timing of costs and benefits that is the opposite of the one in the above explanation.  For 
example, governments have an incentive to initially promise not to confiscate (too much of) the 
wealth created by entrepreneurs in order to strengthen their incentives to actually undertake 
investments, and then, in some later period, deviate from this promise and confiscate substantial 
portions of the created wealth.  In the context of delegation, this kind of behavior may consist in, 
first, promising substantial discretion.  When employees, enthused about their new extended 
discretion, come up with profit-improving ideas about how to improve products, processes, etc., 
managers may harvest these, decide that the organization already has its hands full with 
implementing the ideas, and that the level of delegated discretion may be usefully reduced in 
order to save costs.7  However, the political economy literature referred to above also suggests 
that these problems may be checked by various institutions and mechanisms.  We consider these 
next.  
Credible Delegation 
 The political economy concept of credible commitment (see also Williamson 1996) 
implies that it is often in an organization’s long-term interest to avoid later period actions that 
break promises (with respect to delegation), thereby harming organizational members, and that 
avoiding such behavior may be accomplished by credibly constraining the flexibility of 
managers in such a manner that the initial promise becomes credible (Weingast and Marshall 
1988; Moe 1997).  In the present context, there are two classes of ways in which promises to not 
engage in opportunistic managerial intervention may be made credible, namely what may be 
called internal and external mechanisms.  
 With respect to internal mechanisms, managers may stake their personal reputations 
(Miller 1992; Argyres and Mui 1999), for example, through symbolic and communicative acts, 
 
6 Even if managers are in fact made partly responsible for later organizational costs, their rate of time preference may 
be such that these costs are heavily discounted.   
7 This may help explain why organizations often “vacillate” between loose and hierarchical structures 
(Nickerson and Zenger 2000). 
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for example, announcing in large-scale company gatherings one’s firm commitment to certain 
policies and values (Brockner et al. 1992).   This suggests the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5a: Opportunistic managerial intervention varies negatively with the strength 
of managers’ personal reputations for pursuing a “fair” or “hands off” policy in dealing 
with employees.  
 It is well know that, in general, reputation effects are far from perfect with respect to 
constraining opportunistic behaviors (Williamson 1996).  This also holds for reputation effects 
inside the hierarchy. For example, managers change jobs and may not carry their reputation with 
them.  Corporate cultures are longer lasting than personal reputations and serve to enforce 
implicit contracts in situations where personal reputations fail (Kreps 1990):  
Hypothesis 5b: Opportunistic managerial intervention varies negatively with the extent to 
which corporate culture implies expectations that managers will pursue a “fair” or 
“hands off” policy in dealing with employees.  
 Hierarchical structure also plays a role in constraining managerial opportunistic 
intervention.  Thus, Milgrom (1988) argues that employee rent-seeking that aims at influencing 
hierarchical superiors to selective intervene to the benefit of the rent-seeking employees will be 
constrained by rigid, hierarchical structures which makes such rent-seeking more costly.  Also, 
upper and lower-level managers may differ in their preferences for intervention, for example, 
lower-level managers may derive a private benefit from overruling, whereas upper-level 
managers do not (Aghion and Tirole 1997).  
 A third reason why hierarchical structure may constrain opportunistic managerial 
intervention (in fact, all managerial intervention) is that the hierarchy is not just a structure of 
authority, but also one of information (Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1974).  Thus, there will be an 
informational distance between those possessing authority and those to whom discretion has 
been delegated.  The size of this informational distance influences the basis for exercising 
judgment with respect to decisions whether to overrule employees or not.   All else being equal, 
the more hierarchical layers that information has to pass through before reaching the level 
exercising authority, the less adequate is this basis likely to be.  Moreover, even though there 
may be few hierarchical layers, managerial task descriptions may be such that managers will 
essentially be overloaded if they insist on being sufficiently informed to be in a position to 
overrule.  If the manager realizes that because of information overload, he is not in a position to 
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rationally decide whether to overrule or not, he should not overrule (Aghion and Tirole 1997).  
Thus, this reasoning predicts that overruling of employees is less likely to occur in organizations 
with large informational distances and/or managers that are heavily burdened with information:  
Hypothesis 5c: Opportunistic managerial intervention varies negatively with the 
informational distance in the corporate hierarchy.  
  Some employees or groups of employees may be particularly costly for management to 
overrule, because they control critical resources, notably their own human capital.  For example, 
Henry Ford II and the rest of the Ford top management team tolerated the open disagreement 
with official Ford strategy expressed by Lee Iacocca and his clique of loyal managers, because of 
the marketing skills exercised by Iacocca and his men (Halberstam 1986).  Overruling such 
employees means that they may cut back on the supply of their essential services and may refrain 
from augmenting their valuable human capital.  This suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5d: Opportunistic managerial intervention varies negatively with the degree 
of human capital specificity.  
 Employees with strongly specialized, important human capital may possess considerable 
bargaining power and influence (Rajan and Zingales 1998).   However, such influence may also 
be secured through other means, such as extensive employee ownership of the firm.  This means 
that employee interests may be more strongly reflected in corporate decision-making, implying 
that in such firms, opportunistic managerial intervention may be less prevalent:   
Hypothesis 5e: Opportunistic managerial intervention varies negatively with the degree to 
which employee interests are represented in corporate decision-making.  
With respect to external mechanisms that may enforce delegated discretion, a clear 
example is strong trade unions or professional associations.  Their influence may imply that 
certain rights are so strongly protected (i.e., they are outside the “zone of acceptance,” Simon 
1951) that management cannot realistically change these (Argyres and Liebeskind 1999). 
Hypothesis 5f: Opportunistic managerial intervention varies negatively with the degree of 
unionization and the strength of unions and professional associations.  
 In the following section, we present our data set, the methods we have applied, and the 
results.   
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III. Data, Variables, Constructs, and Results 
Data Collection 
 Data were collected by mail questionnaire after an initial pilot testing of the instrument. 
The sample population is composed of all firms in the Spanish food and electric/electronic 
industries (SIC 20 and SIC 36) with a turnover of 3 million euros or more in the year 20008.  
Following these criteria, the population of the study was drawn from the directory, DB 
Marketing: 700.000 empresas españolas.  This directory is updated on an annual basis by the 
international management consultancy, Dun & Bradstreet.  From this database we identified 
3.040 firms that met the conditions described above.  We mailed an initial questionnaire with a 
customized letter addressed to the production manager in each firm. 36 questionnaires were 
returned, because either the address was wrong or the firm had quitted its activity.  Furthermore, 
not all the remaining questionnaires were valid: Missing values and the unfeasibility of 
identifying the firm to which some of the questionnaires belonged resulted in the final sample 
being composed of 329 firms (11% of the total population).  Assuming the worst scenario for a 
binary variable, where [p = q = 50%], and imposing a confidence level of 95%, these figures 
represent a sampling error of ±5’09%. 
Variables and Constructs  
 Table 1 shows a brief description of the variables.  Some of them required direct figures 
from key respondents, while others have been addressed through the linear combination (using 
Principal Component Analysis) of several indicators generally valued on a five point Likert-type 
scale. 
XXXXXXXX INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE XXXXXXXX 
 The process of building these variables followed two steps. First of all, and based on the 
extant literature (Mowday, Steers and Porter 1982; Dewar, Whetten and Boje 1980; Lawrence 
and Lorsch 1967; Pugh and Hickson 1976; Dow 1987; Grimshaw and Rubery 1998), a list of 
indicators for each variable was presented to a group of three production managers and two 
 
8 The kind of information required for this study is not usually available for smaller firms or results are often 
rather obvious.  Moreover, the greater the size of the firm, the more experience firms have and the higher the 
qualification of the participant regarding the concepts included in the questionnaire; this obviously affects the 
reliability of the responses by making the answers more rigorous. 
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operators from diverse firms.9  They were asked to discuss how representative each indicator was 
of the corresponding construct and propose others that were not in the original list, concluding 
with a different number of indicators for each variable that, in their view, reasonably reflected 
what the variable tried to grasp.  In a second stage, these indicators were tested in twenty 
interviews together with the rest of the items of the questionnaire.  We finally chose those for 
each variable that provided not only the highest Cronbach’s α, but also a first component 
through Principal Component Analysis that could explain more than 50% of the variance of the 
items. 
 This process turned out to be satisfactory, although obviously not perfect.  Thus, for 
corporate culture and managerial opportunism, one or more indicators had to be pulled out in 
order to get a better reliability of the scale (Cronbach’s α should be above 0,7 for a non-
exploratory analysis; cf. Nunnally 1978).  In the case of motivation and delegation of discretion, 
our initial measures based on the literature (Mowday, Steers and Porter 1982, and Dewar, 
Whetten and Boje 1980, respectively) did not offer a first component that could explain more 
than 50% of the variance of the items used in the preliminary test of the survey, so we decided to 
stick to only one item.  Thus, once the indicators were chosen for each construct and data was 
available, Principal Component Analysis was applied for corporate culture and managerial 
opportunism in order to get a single value.  Table 2 shows the main figures. 
XXXXXXXX INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE XXXXXXXX 
 Regarding the validity of the constructs, it is worth noting two issues.  First, concerning 
their uni-dimensionality, we can see in Table 2 that the component that has been extracted can 
explain most of the variance of the items.  Second, searching for the most sensible way to gather 
a representative collection of items for each latent variable, we resorted to a wide range of 
seminal contributions on the measurement of organizational traits as a first step to build the 
scales.  The items used for corporate culture were initially extracted from Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967), Pugh and Hickson (1976) and Kotter and Heskett’s (1992). Although we did not use an 
explicit measurement scale on which to mould the construct of “managerial opportunism,” the 
initial items have been definitely inspired by the insights and specific examples contained in such 
works as Willman (1983), Dow (1987), Rousseau (1989), Miller (1992), and Grimshaw and 
 
9 We considered this step crucial, even for those measures that have previously been tested.  This is because the 
translation of scales from English to Spanish may change the perception of the respondent.  Moreover, the items 
themselves may not make sense for cultural reasons. 
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Rubery (1998).  Finally, and for strictly operational reasons (particularly to search for an easier 
interpretation of absolute figures), the latent variables were subsequently transformed to make 
them start with 1. The algorithm is: 
1) yi* = –(minimum value of y) + 1 + yi  
 Finally, some of the variables referred to in the above hypotheses were not directly 
measured.  This is the case for the “strength of managers’ personal reputations” construct. We 
proxy this construct with the age of the firm variable, based on the argument that young firms 
have higher expected mortality, which implies that the value of a manager’s reputation in 
such a firm is smaller than in an older firm with a lower expected mortality. Also, we did not 
directly measure the construct “informational distance in the corporate hierarchy” (H5c).  We 
proxy this construct with the size variable, because it is reasonable to expect a positive 
relation between the size of a firm and the depth of its corporate hierarchy.  Finally, the 
variable “degree to which employee interests are represented in corporate decision-making” 
(H5e) has been measured by the hierarchical form of the firm, which distinguishes between 
capitalist and worker-owned firms. 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
 Table 3 shows the means, standard deviations and correlations for the variables. Two 
initial important insights have to do with the rather low level of delegation of discretion that 
we can find in our study, whereas managerial opportunism achieves a high figure in average 
terms.  Moreover, both are negatively correlated.  Regarding their association with other 
variables, a high delegation of discretion is strongly related to a strong corporate culture, 
workforce motivation and labor productivity.  On the other hand, managerial opportunism 
appears to be associated with little human specificity involved in the labor transaction, lower 
motivation and socialization, and is especially relevant in SMEs and capitalist firms when 
compared to large corporations and worker owned enterprises, respectively. 
 
XXXXXXXX INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE XXXXXXXX 
 Since the object of our investigation has to do with the interaction among managerial 
opportunism, motivation, and performance, we have developed a path analysis which, 
compared to conventional multivariate techniques, allows us to design a model with various 
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levels of dependency.  Although probably far from being exhaustive in terms of including all 
potentially relevant independent variables, the model does seem to be the best one which our 
insights allowed us to construct prior to this research.  Thus, our aim is not only to verify or 
refute each one of the above hypotheses separately, but also to test whether their interaction is 
statistically significant10.   
 Path analysis assumes that relations among variables are linear, residuals from the 
regressions are not correlated among them and variables are measured without error (Bagozzi 
1982; Bollen and Long 1993).11  Given these assumptions and for the sake of simplicity, we 
can start by designing a diagram that reflects the relations of dependence among the variables 
that are included in our hypotheses.  Next, we will convert this diagram into a system of 
simultaneous equations: this constitutes our structural model with the several path coefficients 
that we estimate here.  Third, we evaluate the model so that the possibility to re-specify it and 
thus achieve a better goodness of fit is assessed.12  Finally, we interpret and evaluate the final 
model. 
 Following this scheme, Figure 1 presents the path diagram with the relations that our 
propositions suggest.  First, observe that the significant correlations among the exogenous 
variables shown in Table 3 have been represented in the diagram by the two-headed arrows.  
Note that these correlations are estimates of the population correlation matrix of the 
independent variables in the model; this is the reason why there are some slight differences 
between these figures presented in Figure 1 and the ones presented in Table 3.  Anyhow, since 
no multicolinearity problems were identified, all correlations among the exogenous variables 
are maintained. 
 Concerning the endogenous variables and starting with opportunistic managerial 
                                                 
10 Construct building (managerial opportunism and corporate culture) could also be implemented in the same 
model.  We chose to do it separately because 1) the results do not change and 2) the final model is thus made 
considerably simpler. 
11 On why motivation is treated as a continuous dependent variable see, for instance, Bohrnestedt and Borgatta 
(1981).  Their argument, which we share, is that the consequences of assuming that data are interval when in fact 
they are ordinal are so small in most cases that the gain in statistical elegance and power justifies the possible 
distortion. 
12 There are dozens of measures of the goodness of fit (GF) for this kind of models, and they are generally 
grouped under three headings: Absolute GF, Incremental GF and Parsimonious GF (Bentler and Bonnet 1980;  
Bollen 1989;  Bollen and Long 1993; Bagozzi 1982, 1991).  The measures used here are the ones which appear 
to be more widespread in the empirical literature and in the specific software packages design for this tool (EQS, 
LISREL, AMOS, etc.).  Moreover, following Hair et al. (1998), these measures have been chosen ex ante, i.e., 
before performing the estimation. 
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intervention, observe that, as suggested by hypothesis 5, it varies negatively with the level of 
expert knowledge involved in the labor transactions (H5d), the strength of corporate culture 
(H5b), the degree of unionization (H5f), and the size (H5c), age (H5a) and hierarchical form 
of the firm (H5e). 
 Next, consider motivation, and observe that the one-headed arrows represent its 
dependency on the level of delegation of discretion (H1) and the degree of managerial 
opportunism (H3).  The latter here also acts as an independent variable, just as it happens also 
in the case of delegation of discretion, which is supposed to decline as managerial 
opportunism increases. 
 Additionally, hypotheses 2 and 4 propose that, despite the fact that firm performance 
obviously depends on many other variables, it will be affected by both the level of delegation 
of discretion and managerial opportunism. 
 Note, finally, that there are also two second order relations involving motivation and 
performance, on the one hand, and managerial opportunism and delegation of discretion, on 
the other. They do not explicitly appear in our set of hypotheses, mainly because these 
interactions have already been well established in previous literature; in the first case, for 
instance, in the such studies as McClelland (1955), Herzberg et al. (1959), and Vroom (1964), 
and in the more recent ones by Prokopenko (1987) or Frey and Osterloh (2002). Regarding 
the relation of managerial opportunism with delegation of discretion, the rationale is that, no 
matter how short termed decisions might be (for instance working overtime, changing shifts, 
assuming new tasks, etc.), delegating discretion restricts the ability of managers to go beyond 
the ex ante agreed “zone of acceptance” in the sense described by Simon (1951), Willman 
(1983), Dow (1987) and Kreps (1990).  Therefore, delegation cannot be credibly sustained in 
firms where managerial opportunism is high.  Thus, the initial structural model takes the 
following form: 
 
(1) man_opp = α1+ β14 hum_spec + β17 socializ + β18 size + β16 age + β15 prop_uni + β13 hf + e1 
(2) perform = α2+ β22 man_opp + β29 motiv + β21 del_disc + e2 
(3) motiv = α3+ β32 man_opp + β31 del_disc + e3 
(4) del_disc = α4+ β42 man_opp + e4 
 
XXXXXXXX INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE XXXXXXXX 
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The path coefficients of the former model are the main object of our estimation; they 
represent the beta weights obtained from a set of multiple regressions on the posited 
relationships within the model.  In this case, given the absence of multivariate normality and 
the size of the sample, the method of estimation has been based on the Maximum Likelihood 
criterion with a bootstrap of 200 sub-samples.13 
Results are shown in Table 4.  The path coefficient reflecting the influence of corporate 
culture on managerial opportunism does not seem to be significant.  The overall measures for 
the goodness of fit, on the other hand, reveal rather ambiguous values.  Thus, although the 
GFI achieves a satisfactory figure (above 0.9), the rest of the measures are rather low (AGFI, 
TLI, NFI, PNFI and PGFI) or offer unacceptable values (Chi-square probability, RMSEA and 
AIC). 
XXXXXXXX INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE XXXXXXXX 
These considerations call for a reformulation of the model in order to achieve a better 
goodness of fit and check the possible influence that including non-significant variables in the 
model might exert on the rest of the path coefficients, which could eventually become non-
significant or suffer important alterations.  Hence, Figure 2 shows a new diagram in which 
corporate culture has been taken out, while the rest of the relationships have been retained in 
the way showed by our re-specified structural model: 
 
(1) man_opp = α1+ β14 hum_spec + β18 size + β16 age + β15 prop_uni + β13 hf + e1 
(2) perform = α2+ β22 man_opp + β29 motiv + β21 del_disc + e2 
(3) motiv = α3+ β32 man_opp + β31 del_disc + e3 
(4) del_disc = α4+ β42 man_opp + e4 
 
XXXXXXXX INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE XXXXXXXX 
Table 5 shows the new results.  In effect, all of the estimators seem now to be 
significant and the fit of the model achieves more than acceptable values except for the Chi-
 
13 A maximum likelihood estimation alone would require multivariate normality.  In order to solve this problem 
(given that our data exhibits a high kurtosis), bootstrapping extracts several random sub-samples and calculates 
the mean of the estimators for each one of them.  Other estimation methods –also valid- like generalized or 
unweighted least squares are less demanding in terms of parametric assumptions, while taking out the cases 
affecting the kurtosis would harm our sample representativeness.  
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square test (reflecting whether there exist significant differences between the observed and the 
reproduced covariance matrix).  In this case, Bollen (1989) has nevertheless shown that the 
higher the size of the sample, the worse the goodness of fit (an ideal size would be between 
100 and 200 cases). Since our sample contains 329 units, this might be the reason why the 
probability of the Chi-square is not significant; note that the rest of the measures, nonetheless, 
confirm that the model is significant. 
With respect to the interpretation of the model, it appears that when compared to 
smaller, younger and capitalist firms, the level of opportunistic managerial intervention 
becomes lower in large corporations, older firms and cooperatives, respectively.  Additonally, 
the propensity of managers to behave opportunistically seems also higher in firms with low 
specific human assets and with a low level of union affiliation.  These findings confirm 
hypotheses 5a, 5c, 5d, 5e and 5f, which state a negative relation between opportunistic 
managerial intervention and, respectively, managers’ personal reputations (proxied by age), 
the informational distance in the corporate hierarchy (proxied by size), the level of human 
capital specificity, the degree to which employee interests are represented in corporate 
decision-making (proxied by hierarchical form), and finally, the strength of unions and 
professional associations (proxied by union affiliation).  
 Moreover, the standardized coefficients convey information for assessing the relative 
influence that each one of the independent variables exerts on managerial opportunism. Thus, 
the hierarchical form of the firm seems to be the main mechanism that helps to avoid 
opportunistic intervention on the part of managers; that is, the higher the degree to which 
employee interests are represented in corporate decision-making, the more difficult it is for 
managers to implement oportunistic interventions.  In fact, it is even more important than the 
bargaining power stemming from local and specific knowledge or from the strength of unions 
in the firm.  The size or the age of the firm, in turn, although significant, apparently explain a 
lower percentage of the variance of the dependent variable. 
XXXXXXXX INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE XXXXXXXX 
Regarding motivation, on the other hand, the results show that (1) workers seem to be 
more motivated in firms with a higher delegation of discretion; (2) as the level of managerial 
opportunism increases workforce motivation clearly goes down; and (3) there is a significant  
indirect effect of managerial opportunistic intervention on motivation through delegation of 
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discretion.  This evidence suggests that we cannot refute hypotheses 1 and 3 linking employee 
motivation to delegation of discretion and managerial opportunistic intervention. 
With respect to firm performance, observe that Figure 2 and Table 5 reflect also two 
additional important facts: to begin with, they confirm Hypotheses 2 and 4 which suggest a 
direct influence of delegation of discretion and managerial opportunistic intervention on firm 
performance.  And secondly, they verify the relevant indirect effects that, regarding workers’ 
productivity, both managerial opportunism and delegation of discretion pose: thus, while the 
latter exerts an indirect effect through motivation (Hypothesis 1), the former does it not only 
through motivation (Hypothesis 3) but also through delegation of discretion itself (second 
order relation). 
V. Concluding Discussion 
In this final section, we sum up how we have contributed to existing theory, discuss 
limitations of the study and suggest implications for future research. 
Contribution to Established Literature 
 Most firms make use of both authority and delegated discretion.  However, the main 
point in this paper is that this gives rise to a latent conflict. The problem arises because 
“contracts” to delegate discretion are not enforceable in a court of law.  Credible delegation 
may therefore be hard to sustain.  However, we have pointed to and analyzed how various 
mechanisms may make delegation credible. 
 Although this set of issues are not neglected in the theory of the firm literature per se 
(e.g. Miller 1992; Aghion and Tirole 1997; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999; Falaschetti 
2002), it is still fair to say that they have been given relatively little attention in this body of 
work.  One manifestation of this is that economics of organization analyses of “opportunism” 
has rather exclusively dealt with employee opportunism (Williamson 1996), employer 
opportunism being almost entirely neglected (cf. Dow 1987).  To be sure, the basic idea that 
we have elaborated in this paper may be argued to be present already in Milgrom’s (1988) 
argument that organizational form partly reflects an attempt to cope with employee rent-
seeking and the inefficient selective intervention that may result from such rent-seeking.  
Also, a number of recent organizational economics contributions clearly go quite some way 
towards understanding the incentive liabilities of centralized authority (e.g., Milgrom and 
  
22
 
Roberts 1996; Aghion and Tirole 1997; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999).  However, this 
remains an under-researched area in the economics of organization literature, particularly 
given the apparently high incidence of managerial opportunism (cf. Coyle-Shapiro and 
Kessler 2000). 
 In contrast to the organizational economics literature, much of the organizational 
behavior literature on psychological contracts, organizational citizenship behavior and the like 
is very strongly empirical.  However, this literature does not explicitly frame the issues in 
rational choice terms.  Still, this literature is considerably more detailed with respect to 
analyzing the actual contents of psychological (implicit) contracts between those who hold 
discretionary authority and those who do not and the psychological mechanisms that are at 
work in the case of perceived contract breach.  We have mainly used this literature to provide 
support for some parts of our hypothesis development.  However, we conjecture that the 
organizational behavior literature in this field and the relevant organizational economics 
literature may well enter a fruitful liaison. 
Limitations  
 A number of inherent limitations of the dataset imply that our analysis is far from 
perfect. First, as in most studies, some of our proxies reflect a certain roughness derived from 
data availability and reliability.  Since their validity has been justified on theoretical as well as 
on empirical grounds, nevertheless, we think that they reasonably represent and capture the 
theoretical constructs they proxy. 
 Second, the limitations of the data set have constrained our theoretical framework.  For 
example, we argue that employee motivation positively depends on the degree of delegation.  
The link between delegation (or “task autonomy”) and motivation has long been recognized 
in social psychology (e.g., Roethlisberger et al. 1939).  It has also long been recognized that 
for delegation to be effective, employees need to have not only the opportunity but also the 
incentive and the ability to engage in self-management.  We have argued that reductions in 
delegation, at least when these are perceived as reflecting managerial opportunism, lead 
employees to reduce effort and human capital investment.  This may lead to a confusion of 
cause and effect.  For example, it is conceivable that cutting back on delegation is a result of 
finding out that employees lack the skills that are necessary to engage in self-management.   
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 Thirdly, more generally, much of our reasoning admittedly proceeds in dynamic terms 
— for example, we make references to breaking psychological contracts —  that do not 
correspond directly to the measures that we use (e.g., we don’t measure the incidence of 
broken contracts) and the cross-sectional nature of the study. 
Implications for Future Research 
 Future research may well start from some of the above limitations.  Thus, panel data 
need to be collected so as to better correspond to the dynamic nature of the argument.    Also, 
it would be desirable if data allowed for cross-country comparisons.  Otherwise, we cannot 
rule out the possibility of a country bias in our results. 
 Our study also suggests a number of avenues for further theoretical research.  An 
obvious route is to formalize our verbal argument.  More substantively, there are theoretical 
implications that await further development.  One such implication is that the problem of 
reducing opportunistic managerial intervention may differ systematically across firms, 
depending on the details of their internal structure so that some organizational forms are 
systematically more heavily burdened with problems of opportunistic managerial 
intervention.    Another implication is that the discussion in this paper relates to the classic 
issue of the determinants of the boundaries of the firm.  Thus, a fundamental premise of the 
analysis in this paper is that in firms delegated decision rights are loaned, not owned (Baker, 
Gibbons, and Murphy 1999).  Ultimate decision-making rights can only be transferred from 
bosses to subordinates by transferring ownership (i.e., creating a new firm).  The problem of 
sustaining credible delegation stems from this basic difference in ownership.  The analysis in 
this paper thus makes direct contact with those modern theories of economic organization 
(Hart 1995; Williamson 1996) that stresses the importance of ownership for understanding the 
boundaries of the firm.  Finally, we have pointed to the desirability of more fully integrating 
organizational behavior perspectives on psychological contracts with organizational 
economics ideas, in order to get a fuller and more relevant understanding of the workings and 
implications of psychological and implicit contracts.   Both fields stand to benefit from such 
an exercise (Gibbons 1999). 
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TABLE 1 
Description of the variables 
 
 Denomination and abbreviation Description 
   
X1 Delegation of discretion (del_disc) Degree of delegation to adapt to eventual modifications on the production line that affect several work stations 
(five levels). 
X2 Managerial opportunism (man_opp) Propensity of a principal to impose orders exceeding the previously agreed limits to other agents who do not 
have to be consulted.  Construct built up with Principal Component Analysis (PCA). 
X3  
 
  
  
  
  
Hierarchical form (hf) Two values: 1 for capitalist firms and 2 for worker owned enterprises (most of the latter belong to the 
Mondragon co-operative). 
X4 Human specificity (hum_spec) Difference between the time that a new worker with no experience in the industry spends until she reaches the 
normal productivity of her mates, and the time that a new worker who does have experience in the industry 
spends until she reaches that normal productivity (five levels). 
X5 Propensity to unionize (prop_uni) 
 
Percentage of unionized workers within the firm. 
X6 Age (age) Three values: 1 for firms that have been in existence for 10 years or less; 2 for firms between 11 and 30 years, 
and 3 for firms with more than 31 years. 
X7 Corporate culture (socializ) Extent to which certain norms and values are widely shared and intensely held throughout the organization.  
Construct built up with PCA. 
X8 Size (size) Two values: 1 for SMEs with less than 100 operators; 2 for the rest. 
X9 Motivation (motiv) Degree to which workers’ commitment encourages them to do their best (five point Likert-type scale). 
X10 Performance (perform) Value added divided by number of operators 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of items retained in each construct built up with Principal Component Analysis 
Var Items in the variable Factor 
loading 
KMO 
index 
Variance 
explained 
Cronbach's α 
M
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m
 Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements 
(1 being  ”strongly disagree” and 5 ”strongly agree”): 
1.-If we paid overtime strictly, the firm would not be sustainable 
2.-Some operators cannot always use up their holidays because of 
production needs 
3.-Flexibility and cost-saving requirements foster the use of short-term 
contracts even for long term employment relationships 
4.-Operators believe that managers press them excessively 
 
 
,849 
,782 
 
,684 
 
 
,704 
,72   57,37 % ,74
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Please, indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements 
(1 being ”strongly disagree” and 5 ”strongly agree”): 
1.-Our operators know the history of the firm and its most important 
achievements 
2.-Our workers are acquainted with the firm’s short- and long-term 
objectives 
3.-Working in our firm makes our workers experience a sense of pride 
 
 
,883 
 
,884 
 
,889 
,72   76,06 % ,84
 
  
 31
 
 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
          
             
           
            
          
        
            
Min. Max. Mean St. dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 del_disc 1 5 1,81 1,15 1
2 man_opp 1 5,35 3,46 1 -,24*** 1
3 hf 1 2 -- -- ,19*** -,44*** 1
4 hum_spec 1 5 2,48 ,972 ,16*** -,36*** ,020 1
5 prop_uni 0 100 31,89 26,44 ,075 -,127** -,42*** ,076 1
6 age 1 3 2,06 ,69 ,048 -,22*** -,1* ,062 ,43*** 1
7 socializ 1 5,54 3,56 1 ,51*** -,26*** ,38*** ,26*** -,139** -,088 1    
8 size 1 2 -- -- ,081 -,26*** -,042 ,029 ,23*** ,31*** -,001 1   
9 motiv 1 4 2,35 ,925 ,37*** -,41*** ,37*** ,24*** -,11** -,017 ,73*** -,02 1  
10 perform -10,6 98,9 11,2 10,45 ,26*** -,33*** ,31*** ,264*** -,09* -,034 ,42*** ,071 ,51*** 1
 
a Pearson correlations for pairs of continuous variables and Spearman correlations when one or the two of them are ordinal 
  or categorical. 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Figure 1 
Model 1 diagram with standardized estimates 
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Figure 2 
Model 2 diagram with standardized estimates 
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TABLE 4 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation for Model 1 
 
dep var./indep. var. Standardized coefficients 
Non 
standard. 
coefficients
Standard 
error t value 
man_opp/socializ -0,035 -0,035 0,046 -0,760 
man_opp/size -0,160 -0,367 0,102 -3,592 
man_opp/age -0,115 -0,164 0,068 -2,416 
man_opp/hf -0,517 -1,644 0,153 -10,739 
man_opp/hum_spec -0,312 -0,318 0,044 -7,263 
man_opp/prop_uni -0,200 -0,008 0,002 -3,938 
del_disc/man_opp -0,238 -0,277 0,062 -4,445 
motiv/man_opp -0,341 -0,341 0,049 -6,938 
motiv/del_disc 0,298 0,257 0,042 6,077 
perform/motiv  0,297 3,756 0,695 5,401 
perform/del_disc 0,211 2,298 0,562 4,092 
perform/man_opp -0,158 -1,994 0,662 -3,010 
     
ABSOLUTE GOODNES OF FIT 
Chi-square = 304,171 / Probability level = 0,000 
Goodness of Fit (GFI) = 0,883 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0,185 
 
INCREMENTAL GOODNES OF FIT 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0,744 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) = 0,444 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0,679 
 
PARSIMONIOUS GOODNES OF FIT 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) = 364,171 
Parsimonious Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0,377 
Parsimonious Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0,402 
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TABLE 5 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation for Model 2 
 
dep var./indep. var. Standardized coefficients 
Non 
standard. 
coefficients
Standard 
error t value 
man_opp/size -0.161 -0,368 0,102 -3,596 
man_opp/age -0.113 -0,159 0,068 -2,347 
man_opp/hf -0.533 -1,686 0,143 -11,802 
man_opp/hum_spec -0.321 -0,326 0,042 -7,689 
man_opp/prop_uni -0.202 -0,008 0,002 -3,947 
del_disc/man_opp  -0,277 0,063 -4,428 
motiv/man_opp -0.342 -0,341 0,049 -6,913 
motiv/del_disc 0.3 0,257 0,042 6,077 
perform/man_opp -0.158 -1,994 0,665 -3,001 
perform/motiv 0.297 3,756 0,695 5,401 
perform/del_disc 0.212 2,298 0,562 4,092 
     
ABSOLUTE GOODNES OF FIT 
Chi-square = 52,735 / Probability level = 0,00 
Goodness of Fit (GFI) = 0,967 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0,071 
 
INCREMENTAL GOODNES OF FIT 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0,927 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) = 0,900 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0,916 
 
PARSIMONIOUS GOODNES OF FIT 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) = 102,735 
Parsimonious Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0,509 
Parsimonious Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0,430 
 
 
 
